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assumption that its discovery was the death knell of ethical naturalism, and also ethical supernaturalism, in any form."1 However, not all recent Western moral philosophers have shared this assumption. The American pragmatist John Dewey, for example, was a proponent of ethical naturalism who gained a large following in the West and (interesting to note in this regard) in China. In Human Nature and Conduct, he sought to bridge the gap between the natural and the moral by giving a role within ethics to "natural impulses" and the empirical observation of human behavior. Indicative of this aspect of his approach in that work is the statement: "Morality is an endeavor to find for the manifestation of impulse in specific situations an office of refreshment and renewal." 12 Due to an implied second premise ("Anyone whom God has created should love Him and His creation"), Crossley points out, the syllogism is formally correct. When we realize that the second premise is an ethical as well as a theological one, we see that the real problem lies beyond any formal distinction between a theological (descriptive) statement and an ethical (normative) one. As Crossley puts it: "There is no logical fallacy in the justifying procedure; the 'problem' lies rather in how one knows in the first place that either of the premises is true." '5 When Crossley addresses this problem, the results are noteworthy for any effort to relate the moral to the ontological (whether one's metaphysics is naturalistic or supernaturalistic). He considers the experience of a "claim" on oneself the starting point for both theology and ethics, explaining his view as follows:
The religious experience of gratitude and the moral experience of obligation have the same root, viz., the experience of being claimed. The experience of God is already partially a moral experience, and the experience of obligation is already. partially a religious experience. This "double" yet finally single starting point for both theology and ethics overcomes, on the one hand, the problem of deriving an ought from an is, and on the other hand, the problem of theological ethics remaining aloof from ordinary moral experience.16
While not immediately relevant, one may wonder whether this theological language has any bearing upon an investigation into the viability of Chinese 168 Jochim naturalistic ethics. Following Crossley a little further, it seems that there is indeed a connection. His final appeal is to process theology, "because such theology tends by its nature to stick close to human experience in its development." 17 This connection is worth mentioning here not only because process thought itself drives theology away from supernaturalism, but also because it has affinities with the Chinese views to be discussed later. This will become clear even as the first part of this essay is concluded, but it will especially strike us when we later see how Chang Tsai's thought itself is dually grounded in the moral and the ontological.
The preceding examples reveal, in different ways, the verdict of modern Western ethics on the subject of the moral viability of the imperative "follow nature"; and, in so doing, My reason for saying that no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others is this. Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of shame, of dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom. Man has these four germs just as he has four limbs (2A: 6). simplicity, spontaneity, and so on. This is not especially new to students of the Tao-te-ching, but Hsu's effort to treat this work as a moral treatise, making specific reference to the descriptive/normative problem, is both new and extremely pertinent to the concerns of this article.
Hsu refers to the products of the assertive use of the will as "causal evils" and distinguishes these from "consequential evils," which are the unnecessary sufferings which result secondarily from "causal evils."30 Strictly speaking, then, only the first are a proper target for moral condemnation, while the second simply give us a reason to have compassion for the suffering of others. At this point, a problem arises: among the condemnable products of the assertive use of the will, Lao-tzu identifies prescriptive morality itself. However, the problem is not that Lao-tzu objects to the moral life as such; he condemns only its degeneration into a form characterized by willfulness and affectation. Therefore, Lao-tzu's idea of the decline of Tao may afford a solution to this apparent problem, and to the related problem of the existence of evil in a world spontaneously produced from Tao. The relevant passages from the Tao-te-ching are cited by Hsu, as follows31: Therefore, when Tao is lost, there arises te. ' When te is lost, jen appears.
When jen is lost, there comes i. When i is lost, there appears li. What then is li?
It is the weakness of loyalty and trust.
It is the beginning of chaos in the world (ch. 38). When the great Tao declines, there appear jen and i (ch. 18). Abandon jen and discard i. Then the people will return to filial piety and compassion (ch. 19).
Thus, mainstays of Confucian morality like jen, i, and li are naught but symptoms of the Tao's decline. We must give up our reliance upon them if we are ever to manifest our true and natural moral qualities (for example, filial piety and compassion). Otherwise, we will manage only to make matters worse; for the operations of Tao can never be disturbed with impunity.
But how can one speak of interfering with its operations at all? Hsu gives us 172 Jochim two reasons to believe that Lao-tzu can sensibly do so: (1) the human will is put in a position of potential interference by Tao's decline, and (2) the will is, in principle, free to interfere at all times. More striking is Hsu's view that the idea of free will, far from being out of place in Lao-tzu's world-view, makes more sense there than it does in the Western context in which a more explicit free will theodicy was produced. He states:
It is important to note that Lao Tzu has no doubt that the will is free to interfere with Tao. He is afraid that the use of the will, however, will cause sufferings in the world and turn the spontaneous universe into a mechanistic one bound by laws and virtues. How different is it from the dominant Western philosophy, which tries to find in the supposedly mechanistic universe a room for the freedom of the will so that it can build an ideal human society apart from nature.32
Whether With the idea of the transformation of the physical nature, we arrive at the true merit of Chang's moral philosophy. This transformation may be affected through learning, but not of the ordinary sense-oriented kind. It is best effected through enlarging the mind, which is tantamount to bringing oneself into harmony with the universe. The Cheng-meng explains:
By expanding one's mind one is able to embody the things of the whole world. If things are not thus all embodied, there will be something that remains external to the mind. The minds of ordinary men are confined within the limits of hearing and seeing, whereas the sage, by completely developing his nature, prevents his mind from being restricted to hearing and seeing (ch. 7).42
In other words, if one relates to the universe only with one's physical nature, with one's senses, it will reveal itself only partially and only as turbid matter. But if one relates to it with one's higher nature, it will reveal itself as a moral universe and a harmonious whole. In this ethical perspective, the category "natural" must be grasped both in its particularly human sense as well as in its reference to nonhuman nature. One can discover human moral nature only through an expansion of one's mind which encompasses all of non-human nature. This dual realization of the moral value of the natural as it exists both in and outside oneself is referred to by Chang as ch'eng ("sincerity"), the concept that was so central in the Chung-yung, his favorite among the early Confucian classics.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article has been to explicate a Chinese form of naturalistic ethics which, due to its underlying view of nature, is not tied to the ideas of providence and natural law. Its underlying view of nature, in fact, may be quite modern by Western standards. Joseph Needham has argued that it borders on being post-Newtonian.43 However, this seems initially to detract from rather than add to its moral relevance, for, in the modern view, nature is wholly amoral. Contemporary moral philosophy, therefore, would appear to have only two alternatives with regard to nature: either to argue for its moral relevance by maintaining a premodern view of nature, along with its feature of an external lawgiver; or to admit its moral irrelevance on the grounds that it is guided by forces indifferent to any divine plan. This is, for example, just the kind of choice we are given in the article on "Philosophical Ideas of Nature" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which states:
If, on the one hand, nature is seen as irreducibly complex, the theater not of a simple cosmic process but of countless and diverse processes, and if these processes have produced mind but are not themselves guided by intelligence, then there will be little plausibility in arguing directly from "natural" to "good" or "obligatory."
On the other hand, where nature is taken as created by a wholly good, wise, and omnipotent deity, to be natural is prima facie, to be worthy of being created by such a being. But the existence of evil, however accounted for, makes the inference (from natural to good or obligatory), even in this context, unreliable. 44 The implication here is clearly that both alternatives are dead ends. Moreover, while the second of these may still have its supporters,45 it was until recently hard to imagine a defense for the first emerging within contemporary Western thought. Taking recent theological and ethical discussion informed by process philosophy into account, this is easier to imagine. In much of Chinese thought, however, it was taken for granted that nature, seen as a complex process in which all the parts participate according to their internal dictates rather than according to external intelligence, is a moral as well as a physical universe.
An understanding of the way in which the Chinese were able to find moral relevance in nature conceived in nearly post-Newtonian fashion might inspire contemporary ethics in a number of "process-oriented" ways. For example, this understanding could suggest a "natural" ground for the type of situational ethics currently in vogue. For it is quite probable that the most important moral values that the Chinese discovered in nature, such as spontaneity, harmoniousness, and adaptability to changing influences, provided the basis 176 Jochim for their own preference for situational over legalistic ethics. A further innovation may come from Chang Tsai's proposal that one's inner moral nature is revealed to oneself only concurrently with the act of grasping the entire scheme of nature as a moral environment. Ironically, then, with his concept of "sincerity," Chang took something akin to that "absence of affectation" which J. S. Mill had found to be the only positive value one could assign to the term "natural," and he raised it to the level of a necessary and sufficient basis for the moral life.
